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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision to consider the constitutionality' of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act or ACA)' has
catapulted the policy debate over health care into a new chapter fraught with
profound questions about the nature of American federalism. Even as the con-
stitutional debate takes center stage, it is worth remembering that the Obama
Administration chose to frame its reform bill as a practical solution to the
country's mounting fiscal challenges. As policy makers begin building the ad-
ministrative machinery that will give life to the Affordable Care Act, it is worth
evaluating their efforts with the law's fiscal goals in mind. The White House
framed its arguments in favor of health care reform by insisting that effective
control of the nation's ballooning deficit would be impossible without reining
in skyrocketing health care costs.' Peter Orszag, head of the White House Office
of Management and Budget from January 2009 through July 2010, spent nearly
the entirety of his term as director of the Congressional Budget Office fi-
ne-tuning the "health reform is deficit reform" argument.4 As Orszag argued in
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, "The rate at which health care
costs grow relative to national income-rather than the aging of the popula-
1. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve several issues with respect to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (nth Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011)
(considering severability and Congress's Article I power to enact an individual
mandate); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(considering severability).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26,
31, & 42 U.S.C.).
3. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Deficit Projected To Soar with New Programs, WASH.
POST (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/
20o9/o8/25/ST20o90825013O9.html ("Orszag said the president will press forward
on health care despite the yawning budget gap, arguing that reform is essential to
reining in the skyrocketing costs of government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid, which threaten to drive deficits even higher as the baby-boom genera-
tion retires.").
4. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Obama's Health Expert Gets Political, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2009, at Ai. Orszag's term as Congressional Budget Office Director began in Janu-
ary 2007. Ex-Clinton Aide Orszag Named New U.S. CBO Director, REUTERS (Jan.
18, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/o/19/us-usa-congress-orszag-id
USN182o422620070119. Just two months later, in a March 2007 letter to Con-
gressman Jeb Hensarling, Orszag identified the need to "restrain cost growth" in
health care as a "central challenge" facing policy makers and as "essential to put-
ting the country on a sounder long-term fiscal path." Letter from Peter R. Orszag,
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tion-will be the most important determinant of future federal spending."' U.S.
health care costs now constitute a share of our gross domestic product (GDP)
that is 7.9 percentage points higher than the average for other countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.' The ability of
health care reformers to effectively control costs will be one of the central pub-
lic- policy challenges of the coming decade.
Thus, one of the primary goals of the ACA's implementers will be to create
a health care system that encourages consumers to make more prudent choices
while driving doctors and insurers to provide health care more efficiently. In
this ongoing project, the insights of behavioral economics will be crucial. While
traditional economic models treat health care as a simple consumption good,
about which rational consumers can efficiently make reasoned decisions in light
of their preferences, a wide range of empirical studies demonstrates that health
care markets are vulnerable to a panoply of market failures. Behavioral eco-
nomics can help explain some of these failures while suggesting more efficient
structures for future health care markets.
This Note proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I review the behavioral econom-
ics literature and develop two key themes that should inform policy makers'
thinking about efficient health care markets. In Part II, I apply these themes to
three prongs of the ACA and outline ways in which the teachings of behavioral
economics can make implementation of the ACA a more effective public-policy
endeavor.
The Supreme Court's recent decision to uphold the constitutionality of the
ACA sets the stage for a new national conversation about how policy makers
implement the law. As signed into law, the ACA expanded Medicaid to require
states to provide full health care coverage for all individuals with incomes below
133 percent of the federal poverty line by 2014.8 States refusing to cooperate
would risk losing their Medicaid funding in its entirety.9 The Court found that
the ACA's provisions expanding Medicaid"o violated the Constitution's Spend-
5. Crisis in the Future: Long-Run Deficits and Debt: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., noth Cong. 42-61 (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Cong. Budget
Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/93xx/doc9385/o6-17-LTBO
Testimony.pdf.
6. Health: Spending Continues To Outpace Economic Growth in Most OECD Coun-
tries, ORG. FOR EcoN. COOPERATION & DEV. (June 30, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/
document/38/o,3746,en_21571361_44315115-48289894_IIii,oo.html.
7. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(io)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c (allowing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to cut
off Medicaid funding to states that do not comply with the program's require-
ments).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(1o)(A)(i)(VIII) (expanding Medicaid); §§ 1396a(k)(1),
1396u-7(b)(5), 18022(b) (defining the new "essential benefits package" that Medi-
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ing Clause" by, in effect, forcing states to accept a new program to provide a
"comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage"
whereas, before, Medicaid was merely a program "to care for the neediest
among us." Rather than strike down the Medicaid expansion sections of the
law in their entirety, however, the Court ruled that states must now be able to
choose, without jeopardizing their current Medicaid funding, whether or not to
accept new funds for Medicaid expansion moving forward." Governors have
already begun announcing their intention not to accept the Medicaid expansion
provision.14 The next few years are thus ripe for an experiment in federalism on
a massive scale as states not only implement the ACA but also decide whether to
accept new Medicaid funding as well. The aim of this Note is to analyze how the
teachings of behavioral economics can provide practical advice to state and fed-
eral policy makers as they make these decisions.
I. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH CARE REFORM: KEY THEMES
The policy debate over health care reform tends to pit two worthwhile
goals, expanded access to health care and aggressive efforts at cost containment,
against each other. 5 The ACA is ambitious in its attempt to accomplish both of
these goals simultaneously. On the immediate coverage side, the ACA creates
short-term, high-risk pools for adults with preexisting conditions who would
otherwise be unable to obtain insurance. States have the option of either ad-
ministering their own high-risk pools with substantial federal assistance or al-
lowing the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to administer the
pools on their behalf." In 2014, individuals will then be able to transfer out of
the high-risk pools into insurance plans that can no longer discriminate on the
caid enrollees must receive); § 1396d(y)(1) (describing how the Medicaid expan-
sion is to be funded).
n. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. I (granting Congress the power to "pay the Debts and
provide for the . .. general Welfare of the United States").
12. Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
13. Id. at 2607-2608.
14. See Press Release, Florida Governor Rick Scott, Florida Won't Implement Option-
al Portions of ObamaCare (July 1, 2012), http://www.flgov.com/2012/o7/o1/florida
-wont-implement-optional-portions-of-obamacare; Renee Dudley, Haley Admin-
istration "Opts Out" of Health Care Expansion, PosT & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.)
(June 29, 2012), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/2o12o629/PC16/12o629107/
1177/haley-administration-opts-out-of-health-care-expansion.
15. See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., Into the Mire, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 201o, at A27.
16. See AMANDA CASSIDY, HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: PRE-ExISTING
CONDITION INSURANCE PLAN 2 (June 13, 2011), available at http://www
.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief pdfs/healthpolicybrief_47.pdf (provid-
ing an overview of high-risk plans).
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basis of preexisting conditions.17 Also beginning in 2014, the ACA creates a se-
ries of health care exchanges, or marketplaces, in which consumers not covered
by an employer-based insurance plan can select individual-coverage options
from a "one-stop shop" of approved plans." Individuals and families with gross
incomes up to 400% of the poverty level will receive subsidies to assist them in
purchasing insurance.'9 Meanwhile, the ACA's individual-mandate provision
will require individuals to purchase insurance or face a tax penalty beginning in
2014.20
With respect to cost containment, the ACA contains a host of provisions
seeking to decrease the growth rate in health care costs-that is, to "bend the
cost curve."" One provision in particular is ripe for closer examination through
the lens of behavioral economics. As of 2013, the provision creates an Independ-
ent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) whose mission is to limit the growth rate
in Medicare spending.2 If Medicare spending exceeds certain defined targets,
IPAB has the authority to make recommendations for cost containment to
Congress for fast-track consideration.
Policy makers must implement these reforms in the context of extraordi-
nary uncertainty about which interventions will actually help control health
care costs. Some areas, like the administrative apparatus underlying health care
delivery, seem ripe for reform. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the
public-policy branch of the McKinsey consulting firm, the United States spends
$91 billion more on health administration and insurance than McKinsey's anal-
17. Id.
18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1301,
1302, 124 Stat. 119, 162-68 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18022). For a
helpful primer on the exchanges and the rulemaking process currently underway,
see Affordable Insurance Exchanges: More Choices, Competition, and Clout,
HEALTHCARE.GOV (last updated Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/
factsheets/exchangeso7n20lb.html.
19. ACA § 1401 (delineating tax credits).
20. Id. § 1501 (describing the individual mandate as a "[r]equirement to maintain
minimum essential coverage").
21. See ENGELBERG CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM AT BROOKINGs, BENDING THE
CURVE THROUGH HEALTH REFORM IMPLEMENTATION (2010) [hereinafter BEND-
ING THE CURVE], available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2oo/ho-btc_II
.aspx.
22. ACA § 10320.
23. JACK EBELER, HEALTH POLICY ALTS., INC., AND TRICIA NEUMAN & JULIETTE CU-
BANSKI, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. PROGRAM ON MEDICARE POLICY, THE IN-
DEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD: A NEW APPROACH TO CONTROLLING
MEDICARE SPENDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/
8150.pdf.
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ysis suggests is commensurate with the country's wealth.2 4 On the other hand,
there is not a scholarly consensus on whether it is possible to bend the cost
curve at all. Pessimists point to historical data that indicate that the relationship
between U.S. GDP per capita and national health care expenditures per capita
has been practically one-to-one for as long as there are data available. In other
words, national wealth and health care spending increase in a constant, mono-
tonic relationship." This might suggest that Americans are simply predisposed
to enjoy high spending on health care as a consumption good and that, short of
a drastic change in national preferences, the cost curve will remain inelastic.
A recent example illustrates just how elusive real cost containment can be.
Many health care reformers, including President Obama, have long argued that
the adoption of electronic medical records will eliminate wasteful reliance on
failure-prone paper records and lead to tangible health care savings." Recent
research, however, indicates precisely the opposite result: The adoption of elec-
tronic medical records increases health care spending because doctors using dig-
ital records are more likely to order expensive diagnostic tests (possibly because
digital technology makes ordering such tests easier). 7 This example underscores
just how difficult it is to know whether cost-oriented reforms will be effective."
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that health care markets can
become more efficient. Data from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices demonstrate that there is little relationship nationwide between outcome
measures of health care quality (outputs) and health care spending (inputs).
Using data from the Dartmouth Atlas Project, researchers have divided the
country into 306 Hospital Referral Regions, most of which are slightly larger
24. DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF
US HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 21 (2008),
http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Americas/Accounting-for-the
cost-of US-health-care.
25. See Robert S. Woodward & Le Wang, The Oh-So Straight and Narrow Path: Can
the Health Care Expenditure Curve Be Bent?, HEALTH EcON. (July 14, 2011),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/lo.1002/hec.1765/full (citing Robert M. Gibson,
National Health Expenditures, 1978, 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (1979); Mi-
cah Hartman et al., Health Spending Growth at a Historic Low in 2oo8, HEALTH
AFF., Jan. 201o, at 147).
26. See, e.g., David Goldman, Obarma's Big Idea: Digital Health Records, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 12, 2009, 4:05 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2oo9/o1/12/technology/stimulus
health-care.
27. Steve Lohr, Digital Records May Not Cut Health Costs, Study Cautions, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at Bi.
28. For the pessimistic view, see Matthew Yglesias, Why Nothing Will Ever Reduce
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than counties and occasionally cross state boundaries. 9 Each Hospital Referral
Region reports data on spending and health care outcomes. There are two key
takeaways from the data. First, there is no obvious relationship between per
capita health care spending and quality of care.30 Second, comparisons between
high-spending areas and low-spending areas could reveal a path to health care
savings. Dartmouth Atlas researchers have concluded that nationwide health
care expenditures could be slashed by 29% if spending in medium and high-cost
areas could be brought in line with spending in low-cost areas.31
What accounts for the regional variation in health care spending? Atul
Gawande, a professor at Harvard Medical School, visited McAllen, Texas-a
Hospital Referral Region with some of the highest medical expenses in the
country-in order to answer that question.32 His conclusion, after interviewing
patients, doctors, and insurance providers, was that the difference between
McAllen and more efficient communities is not a function of administrative
overhead, cost of treatment, or the underlying health of the population. Rather,
Gawande concluded that the medical community in McAllen had gradually
embraced an ethic of over-treatment, over-charging, and over-reimbursement.
As Gawande put it, "Health-care costs ultimately arise from the accumulation
of individual decisions doctors make about which services and treatments to
order. The most expensive piece of medical equipment, as the saying goes, is a
doctor's pen."3
Behavioral economics can be a useful framework to explain these findings
and to analyze health care policy options in light of them. The key lesson of be-
havioral economics is that human actors often respond to incentives in surpris-
ing and counterintuitive ways. Insofar as health care reformers are able to de-
sign systems that channel and respond to those idiosyncrasies, the lessons of
behavioral economics will prove crucial to controlling costs while expanding
coverage. Reviewing both the behavioral economics literature and research in
the health care economics field, the remainder of this Part identifies two key
themes of behavioral economics that illustrate how its teachings can lead to bet-
ter health care policy. First, consumers' abilities to make "rational" choices are
predictably constrained, especially in situations involving complex calculations
29. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 2978, GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN HEALTH
CARE SPENDING 3 n.2 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/
doc8972/o2-15-GeogHealth.pdf.
30. See Peter Orszag, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, Health Care and Behavioral Econom-
ics, Presentation to the National Academy of Social Insurance 5 (May 29, 2008),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/93xx/doc9317/o5-29-NASISpeech.pdf.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About
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and probabilistic trade-offs. Second, principal-agent dynamics in health care
markets can further frustrate efficient health care consumption choices.
A. Theme 1: Bounded Rationality and the Need for Simplicity
At a fundamental level, policy makers must grapple with the extent to
which individuals are able to make sensible health care choices. If health care
markets were efficient, then consumers would always make choices that maxim-
ize their utility. In this world, policy interventions should focus solely on reduc-
ing mundane barriers to efficiency, such as decreasing information and transac-
tion costs. Alternatively, we may live in a world in which consumers make
systematically suboptimal choices about health care and insurance. This Section
advances the argument that individuals do in fact struggle to make probabilistic
decisions of the kind necessary to make efficient health care choices.
i. The Probability Problem and Health Care Consumption Choices
The traditional efficient market model of consumer behavior posits that a
rational purchaser, cognizant of her preferences and with perfect information
about her options in the marketplace, will efficiently allocate her resources in a
way that best accommodates those preferences.34 The findings of behavioral
economics, however, demonstrate that this model fundamentally breaks down
when it comes to health care consumption.
First, it is helpful to have a framework for analyzing how individuals make
health care decisions. Michael Grossman, one of the pioneers in the field of
health economics, developed an economic model for analyzing the various fac-
tors that contribute to individual health outcomes." His model presumes that
an individual's health depends on three baskets of variables: genetic makeup,
certain environmental factors, and independent decisions regarding resource
allocation."6 An individual's health-related decisions will, in turn, vary depend-
ing on human capital (including education level and socioeconomic status), ex-
penditure decisions, and choices regarding lifestyle and well-being." Research
34. See Jeffrey Liebman & Richard Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance,
Subtle Subsidies, in USING TAXES To REFORM HEALTH INSURANCE: PITFALLS AND
PROMISES 230, 232 (Henry J. Aaron & Leonard E. Burman eds., 20o8) (discussing
how the realities of insurance consumption depart from the "textbook model" of
utility maximization).
35. Michael Grossman, On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health,
80 J. POL. EcON. 223, 224 (1972) (describing differences between health capital and
other forms of human capital).
36. Id. at 224-25.
37. For a lengthier discussion of the health production model, see Barak D. Richman,
Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid's Failure, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 705, 719-22 (2005).
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regarding bounded rationality directs us to examine the quality of expenditure
decisions-specifically, whether individuals have the cognitive capacity to accu-
rately assess different health care consumption options and make rational
choices regarding their personal health care.
An explanatory note is in order. Here, I use the term "rational" to indicate
health care decisions that (1) correctly capture an individual's preferences and
(2) best maximize future utility in light of present information. The "rationali-
ty" problem thus has two facets. First, consumers may have difficulty identify-
ing their own preferences, especially when weighing complex, probabilistic
choices. Second, consumers may misperceive which choices maximize future
utility. This occurs because consumers minimize the future costs of present de-
cisions. Such miscalculations can run the gamut from engaging in risky behav-
iors, such as smoking or overeating, to failing to adequately insure against nega-
tive future health outcomes.
Understanding the ability of individuals to make rational health care deci-
sions is absolutely central to the health reform debate. Republican opponents of
the ACA, for example, have proposed a complete overhaul of the Medicare sys-
tem. Under one plan, individuals would receive vouchers that would allow
them to make more health care consumption choices on their own.38 Knowing
the extent to which consumers are rationally able to weigh the costs and bene-
fits of health care options is key to evaluating the viability of this proposal.
The data indicate that increased reliance on consumer decision making is
deeply problematic. Decisions about health care consumption are largely about
insurance and are therefore fundamentally probabilistic. 39 A consumer must
weigh the cost of a present expenditure against the possibility of future illness or
medical catastrophe.4o The behavioral economics literature highlights that peo-
ple are terrible decision makers when it comes to these types of calculations.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, two of the founders of behavioral eco-
nomics, have convincingly demonstrated that probability-related decisions are
subject to a wide variety of biases. 4' Three in particular merit further discussion
here: the representativeness heuristic, pseudocertainty, and optimism bias.
The representativeness heuristic involves making probabilistic judgments
about the relationship between two events or processes. In assessing whether
"object A belongs to class B," or whether "event A originates from process B,"
Tversky and Kahneman observe that "probabilities are evaluated by the degree
to which A resembles B."42 In other words, in a collision between probabilistic
38. See Jackie Calmes, Vouchers Proposed for Medicare in 2021, CAUCUS, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2010, 9:15 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2olo/11/17/vouchers
-proposed-for-medicare-in-2021.
39. Richman, supra note 37, at 722.
40. Id.
41. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
42. Id. at 1124.
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thinking and reliance on simple stereotypes, people often use stereotypical
thinking. In one evocative example from a related solo research endeavor,
Kahneman provided the following description to their research subjects:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of dis-
crimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear
demonstrations.43
When presented with various possible descriptions of Linda's professional life,
85% of research subjects indicated that it was more likely that "Linda is a bank
teller and active in the feminist movement" than that "Linda is a bank teller."
This result is illogical: There must be fewer feminist bank tellers in the world
than bank tellers. Individuals, however, associate the description of Linda with a
stereotypical feminist and react accordingly. Tversky and Kahneman refer to
this feature of the representativeness heuristic as the "conjunction fallacy."44
In one sense, this result is unsurprising. The fact that people make proba-
bilistic judgments based on stereotypes is intuitive. Critically, however, use of
the representativeness heuristic also leads to systematic errors in the way people
process probability-related information. First, people tend to ignore "base rate"
information when assessing probability-related outcomes. In another experi-
ment, Tversky and Kahneman told their research subjects that 70/b of people in
the hypothetical were engineers and 30% were lawyers. When provided with just
this information, subjects tended to guess that an unknown individual was an
engineer or a lawyer at rates of 0.7 and 0.3, respectively.45 When provided with a
neutral personality description46 however, those probabilities shifted to 0.5. In
other words, people overreact to what Tversky and Kahneman call "worthless
evidence."47 A more formal way to describe this phenomenon is to say that peo-
ple are poor Bayesian updaters48 by which economists mean that people are not
43. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Eco-
nomics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1462 (2003).
44. Id. (summarizing findings); see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional
Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 4
PsycHOL. REV. 293 (1983).
45. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 1125.
46. For example, "Dick is a 30 year old man. He is married with no children. A man
of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field.
He is well liked by his colleagues." Id. This description is intended to provide no
information on the relative probability that Dick is an engineer or a lawyer.
47. Id.
48. For a description of rational Bayesian behavior, see Lara J. Wolfson, Joseph B. Ka-
dane & Mitchell J. Small, Bayesian Environmental Policy Decisions: Two Case Stud-
ies, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1056, 1057 (1996) ("The decision maker, when
behaving as a rational Bayesian, would... choose the decision that, based on his
or her prior beliefs, updated by collected data, is likely to have the least adversarial
consequences when compared to other possible decisions.").
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especially skillful at integrating new probabilistic information into their predic-
tions. Economist David Grether, in an experiment designed to test the robust-
ness of Tversky and Kahneman's findings, found some empirical evidence to
suggest that individuals become more confident and precise at Bayesian updat-
ing as they gain experience manipulating probabilities in similar situations. 9
This fact provides little comfort in the health care context, however, where in-
dividuals purchase insurance to hedge against illnesses or injuries that are un-
likely. In other words, Bayesian learning involves manipulating two pieces of
information: a prior probability based on previous information and a posterior
probability based on newly acquired evidence."o The lure of the representative-
ness heuristic, however, leads people to neglect base rates (prior probabilities)
and overinterpret new evidence. Because many health care decisions are "sin-
gle-shot" processes that are unlikely to repeat themselves, the structure of the
"insurance-purchasing game" does not lend itself to effective Bayesian learning.
A second systemic error in manipulating probabilities is "pseudocertainty."
As Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate, pseudocertainty is the gravitation to-
ward outcomes that appear to minimize variability but are in fact subject to
conditions that make this certainty illusory." To demonstrate the power of the
pseudocertainty phenomenon, Tversky and Kahneman presented a series of
cancer diagnosis-and-treatment scenarios to a group of seventy-two physicians
and asked the physicians to select their preferred treatment.52 The scenarios
were as follows, with the percentage of physicians who chose the specific treat-
ment appearing in brackets:
Case i
Treatment A: 20% chance of imminent death and 80% chance of nor-
mal life, with an expected longevity of 30 years. [35%]
Treatment B: certainty of a normal life, with an expected longevity of t8
years. [65%]
Case 2
Treatment C: 80% chance of imminent death and 20% chance of nor-
mal life, with an expected longevity of 30 years. [68%]
Treatment D: 75% chance of imminent death and 25% chance of nor-
mal life, with an expected longevity of 18 years. [32%]
49. David M. Grether, Bayes' Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heu-
ristic, 95 Q.J. ECON. 537, 553-55 (i98o).
50. Grether models this process mathematically. Id. at 547-49.
51. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Behavioral Foundations of Economic The-
ory, 59 J. Bus. S251, S268-70 (1986).
52. Id. at S269.
471
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Case 3
Consider a new case where there is a 25% chance that the tumor is
treatable and a 75% chance that it is not. If the tumor is not treatable,
death is imminent. If the tumor is treatable, the outcomes of the treat-
ment are as follows:
Treatment E: 20% chance of imminent death and 80% chance of nor-
mal life, with an expected longevity of 30 years. 132%]
Treatment F: certainty of normal life, with an expected longevity of 18
years. [68%]
The physician response rates to these scenarios illustrate several impulses in
the way people respond to probabilistic information. With respect to Case i, the
physicians made a risk-averse choice by choosing a certain outcome with a low-
er expected lifetime (18 years in treatment B versus 24 years in treatment A)."
With respect to Case 2, because imminent death is likely in either instance, the
physicians gravitated toward the treatment offering the greatest expected life (6
years in treatment C versus 4.5 years in treatment D).54 Doctors' preferences
with respect to Case 3, however, are somewhat surprising and demonstrate the
pseudocertainty phenomenon. As Tversky and Kahneman point out, the popu-
larity of Treatment F rests on the fact that it appears to ensure survival, despite
the fact that this result is conditional on the treatability of the tumor. When this
underlying condition is considered, the actual likelihood of survival under
Treatment F is only 25%." In fact, the conditional probability renders the ex-
pected life outcomes of Treatments E and F identical to those of Treatment C
and D (6 years and 4.5 years, respectively). Because of the way the conditional
probabilities were framed, however, physicians gravitated toward the option
that provided pseudocertainty rather than considering the relevant prior proba-
bilities.
These two phenomena-reliance on the representative heuristic and gravi-
tation toward pseudocertainty-suggest that health care consumers are poorly
equipped to make independent, rational health care consumption choices. As
discussed above, efficient health care decisions are inherently probabilistic. But
the use of representative thinking demonstrates that consumers are poor Bayes-
ian learners who have difficulty integrating new probabilistic data into their ex-
isting knowledge. Further, the pull of pseudocertainty suggests that framing de-
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Unfortunately, health care decisions are even more complex and er-
ror-prone than reliance on these heuristics might suggest. As economists Jeffrey
Liebman and Richard Zeckhauser argue, "To figure out which health insurance
choice maximizes expected utility, one needs to know the probabilities, finan-
cial costs, and health-related utilities associated with each possible state of the
world. Securing knowledge of any of these components is problematic."'"
Moreover, the doctor-patient relationship can compound these difficulties. As
Subsection I.B.1 of this Note describes, patients rely on physicians to provide
them with critical health care information and to make treatment decisions in
their best interests. That is, patients (principals) outsource health care decision
making to their doctors (agents). The dynamics of the principal-agent relation-
ship between doctor and patient, however, can frustrate doctors' ability to
communicate with patients and patients' ability to trust that their physicians are
acting in their best interests.
As if these challenges to processing and manipulating probabilistic infor-
mation were not problematic enough, consumers are also subject to a wide ar-
ray of optimism bias-that is, the "mistaken belief that one's chances of experi-
encing a negative event are lower (or a positive event higher) than that of one's
peers."" This has obvious implications for health care markets in which con-
sumers make consumption choices based on the likelihood of suffering some
future adverse health outcome. As psychologist William Klein explains, "[I]f
people underestimate their risk of experiencing a negative health outcome, they
will be less likely to take precautions to prevent that outcome from occurring."58
Optimism bias also has the effect of leading people to underestimate the harm-
ful consequences of risky behavior, such as smoking59 or binge drinking.'o
Moreover, optimism biases are reinforced through social-feedback loops. Re-
searchers have identified a "false consensus effect" whereby individuals ration-
alize their behavior by adopting the belief that their peers engage in similar ac-
56. Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 34, at 232-33.
57. William M.P. Klein, Optimistic Bias, NAT'L CANCER INST., HEALTH BEHAVIOR
CONSTRUCTS: THEORY, MEASUREMENT & RES. 1, http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/
brp/constructs/optimistic bias/optimistic-bias.pdf (last updated Apr. 28, 2008).
58. Id. at 3.
59. See, e.g., Amanda J. Dillard, Kevin D. McCaul & William M.P. Klein, Unrealistic
Optimism in Smokers: Implications for Smoking Myth Endorsement and
Self-Protective Motivation, n1 J. HEALTH COMM.: INT'L PERSP. 93, 100 (20o6) (find-
ing that optimism leads to rationalizations that can perpetuate smoking behav-
ior).
6o. See, e.g., Amanda J. Dillard, Amanda M. Midboe & William M.P. Klein, The Dark
Side of Optimism: Unrealistic Optimism About Problems with Alcohol Predicts Sub-
sequent Negative Event Experiences, 35 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1540
(2009).
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tivities."' Individuals who engage in risky behaviors, like smoking, tend to over-
estimate the proportion of their cohort that engages in similar conduct.'" This
false perception can lead to a situation in which "[i]nflation of the real consen-
sus may serve to reinforce practices and modes of conduct that increase the
probability of illness or injury.""
From the perspective of the health production function, optimism bias thus
severely skews the trade-off between present expenditures and future utility.
Moreover, these departures from the model of the perfectly rational consumer
do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they are layered on top of misleading or in-
correct mathematical intuitions. These mistakes include basic misconceptions
regarding chance6 4 and poor intuitions regarding regression toward the mean."
Regression toward the mean is shorthand for the fact that in most distributions
the majority of possible outcomes cluster near the average. A standard normal
distribution, with most observations clustered around the mean, is the most
obvious example. As a consequence, the observation of any extreme value will
most likely be followed by a value closer to the average. This tends to scramble
our normal intuitions regarding cause and effect: Individuals will want to create
an explanation for the observed "change" rather than realize they are simply ob-
serving the statistical reality that average outcomes are more likely than extreme
ones.6 6 Even experienced statisticians sometimes fall into this analytical trap. In
one infamous example, Horace Secrist's 1933 book The Triumph of Mediocrity in
Business offered reams of data to advance the conclusion that poorly perform-
ing businesses will tend to improve over time while outstanding firms will tend
to decline.6 7 Far from a novel conclusion, Secrist just described an obvious sta-
tistical phenomenon. One can easily see how this kind of misapprehension
could affect health care consumption. A patient experiencing a particularly se-
vere medical episode (such as a flu) followed by a less alarming sickness (such a
mild cold) could mistakenly conclude that some preventative measure or
change in behavior was effective at warding off severe illness, when instead it
turns out that severe illnesses are simply rare.
In addition to misleading intuitions about cause and effect, consumers may
also have difficulty predicting the way in which present choices will affect future
61. Jerry Suls, Choi K. Wan & Glenn S. Sanders, False Consensus and False Uniqueness
in Estimating the Prevalence of Health-Protective Behaviors, 18 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 66,
67-68 (1988) (defining the false consensus effect).
62. Id. at 74.
63. Id. at 77.
64. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 1125.
65. Id. at 1126-27.
66. See, e.g., Stephen M. Stigler, Regression Towards the Mean, Historically Considered,
6 STAT. METHODS MED. RES. 103 (1997) (collecting examples).
67. HORACE SECRIST, THE TRIUMPH OF MEDIOCRITY IN BUSINESS (1933); Stigler, su-
pra note 66, at 113.
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happiness. Humans are prone to a wide range of "consumption errors"-that
is, misperceiving the expected utility from a future action and thus behaving in
a way that leads to the misallocation of resources.68 This observation applies in a
wide variety of contexts. In one study, researchers found that consumers are
terrible judges of future utility when it comes to the psychological costs of long
commutes, consistently overvaluing the benefits of living far from their places
of work (such as more housing square footage in the suburbs) and undervalu-
ing the cost of commuting (such as time spent on the road and in traffic).*9 In
the health care context, individuals may underperceive the costs of future set-
backs.7 o This suggests that people may fail to take appropriate steps to avoid or
insure against such outcomes.
In short, people are simply not adept at the kind of probabilistic thinking
that would facilitate the development of a "rational" health care market where
individuals are able to maximize utility in line with their preferences. Instead,
people are generally overly optimistic about their health. Reliance on repre-
sentative thinking makes it difficult to integrate new information into health
care choices. Finally, gravitation toward pseudocertain outcomes makes people
susceptible to various framing effects. Even physicians may gravitate toward
treatments that promise the illusion of more certain outcomes. 7' Poor statistical
intuitions further exacerbate these challenges. Facing these barriers, consumers
will have difficulty making health care consumption choices in ways that max-
imize future happiness.
2. Policy Challenges in a Near-Universal Health Care System
The introduction of a near-universal health care system,"7 such as that en-
acted by the ACA, addresses some of the policy challenges relating to bounded
68. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, What Happiness Research Can Tell Us About
Self-Control Problems and Utility Misprediction 12-20 (Inst. for the Study of Labor,
Univ. of Zurich, Discussion Paper No. 1952, 20o6), available at ftp://ftp.iza.org/
dps/dp1952.pdf (describing the weaknesses of revealed-preference models of con-
sumer behavior that assume that consumers' past choices are utility-maximizing).
69. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Economic Consequences of Mispredicting Utility
18-20 (Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 218,
2004), available at https://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2005/0108-1015_1202.pdf.
70. Stutzer & Frey, supra note 68, at 19.
71. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51, at S269.
72. I use the term "near-universal" to distinguish the subsidy and mandate mecha-
nism of the ACA from a true, universal health care plan along the lines of the Brit-
ish National Health Service. According to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
while the ACA will more than halve the uninsured proportion of the population,
some 23 million are expected to remain uninsured. Among non-elderly adults,
approximately 37% are expected to be eligible for insurance programs but not take
advantage of them (presumably violating the individual mandate provision),
while 25% are estimated to be undocumented immigrants. MATTHEw BUETTGENS
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rationality and leaves others unresolved. Here, I use the term "bounded ration-
ality" as shorthand for the myriad biases and misjudgments discussed above
that frustrate one's ability to make choices that maximize utility.73
Near-universal health care systems are often successful in significantly re-
ducing the problem of underconsumption of low-cost, preventative health care.
As the discussion in Subsection I.A.1 illustrates, however, consumers may sys-
tematically undervalue present expenditures that result in greater health-related
utility in the future. Initial evidence from the Massachusetts experiment with
universal coverage reveals that more than 97% of state residents are now in-
sured.74 This statistic indicates that compelled participation in insurance mar-
kets alleviates some concerns about underconsumption. If anything, Massachu-
setts now appears to be experiencing a shortage in certain kinds of medical care
providers, such as primary-care physicians, as a result of the increased demand
for services.7 1
Universal participation in insurance markets, however, highlights another
key challenge facing health care reformers: how to create a functioning system
for selling a probabilistic good (health insurance) to consumers who have
demonstrated a striking lack of facility in making probabilistic decisions. While
the individual mandate of the ACA will require individuals to purchase insur-
ance, policy makers will need to make decisions about implementation that
steer consumers toward (i) choosing an efficient insurance policy and (2) mak-
ing rational consumption choices while insured.
The teachings of behavioral economics offer helpful guidance to those seek-
ing to implement the ACA efficiently. I take as a starting point Kahneman's
theory that decision making takes place within a two-tiered "architecture of
cognition."'' In this framework, human cognition occurs within two neural sys-
tems. System i is intuitive, relying on a series of heuristics, subconscious associ-
ations, and mental shortcuts to make quick judgments about how to interpret
data. System 2, on the other hand, involves conscious cognition and purposive
reasoning to methodically process data according to formulaic rules. On
& MARK A. HALL, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHO WILL BE UNINSURED
AFTER HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM? 5 (20n), available at http://www.rwjf.org/
files/research/71998.pdf.
73. See Kahneman, supra note 43, at 1449 ("Our research attempted to obtain a map
of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the beliefs
that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices
assumed in rational-agent models.").
74. STAN DORN, IAN HILL & SARAH HOGAN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE
SECRETS OF MASSACHUSETTS' SUCCESS: WHY 97 PERCENT OF STATE RESIDENTS
HAVE HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2009), available at http://www.shadac.org/files/
shadac/publications/SecretsOfMassSuccessLongPaper.pdf.
75. See Kevin Sack, In Massachusetts, Universal Coverage Strains Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 20o8, at Ai.
76. Kahneman, supra note 43, at 1450-52.
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Kahneman's telling, System 2 largely acts as a monitoring system for System 1.
That is, humans operate using System i rules until System 2 senses a need to en-
gage in order to make more accurate decisions or to correct for System i's
shortcomings. Kahneman reasons that this arrangement makes adaptive sensen:
Since the "operations of System 2 are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately
controlled,"' 8 the brain tends to use them only when necessary. This is a natural
consequence of the fact that "overall capacity for mental effort is limited." 79
The value of this two-tiered typology is that it provides an elegant explana-
tion for the panoply of bounded rationality phenomena. Our brains, Kahneman
hypothesizes, are hardwired to direct different tasks to the appropriate system
in an effort to handle the reality that the "overall capacity for mental effort is
limited."so This limited capacity leads to predictably suboptimal decision mak-
ing in the face of complexity. Some laboratory research on animals indicates
that poor decision making in the face of complexity "reflects hardwired cogni-
tive behavior patterns."" The discussion of poor probabilistic decision making
in the preceding Subsection further highlights the extent to which individuals
have difficulty integrating complex information in order to make rational
choices.
This reality has profound implications for the way in which we think about
the health care marketplace. At the individual level, it suggests that expanding
one's set of options-normally assumed to increase utility-may actually have
deleterious consequences. Social psychologists refer to this phenomenon as
"choice overload," denoting the fact that complexity in decision making can ac-
tually decrease satisfaction and motivation." On one level, this is counterintui-
tive. We tend to think that having more choices is an unalloyed good in that it
allows us to satisfy our preferences more precisely.3 Psychologists Sheena S.
77. Id. at 1454 ("The compound cognitive system that has been sketched here is an
impressive computational device. It is well-adapted to its environment and has
two ways of adjusting to changes: a short-term process that is flexible and effort-
ful, and a long-term process of skill acquisition that eventually produces highly ef-
fective responses at low cost.").
78. Id. at 1451.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 34, at 236.
82. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One De-
sire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 995, 996
(2000).
83. The intuition that abundant information and multiplicity of choice is an obvious
social good is a common trope. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)
(defining the purpose of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as preventing
harm "to society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas" when citizens must comply with overbroad speech restrictions).
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lyengar and Mark R. Lepper, however, present empirical evidence that suggests
otherwise. They discuss the findings of three experiments that indicate how
complexity can decrease satisfaction. In the first experiment, they found that
customers who sampled jam at a booth offering just six flavors were more likely
to purchase jam than if they had sampled at a booth offering twenty-four fla-
vors.8 4 In the second experiment, they presented undergraduate students with
either six or thirty topics on which they could write an extra-credit essay." The
researchers then measured the students' motivation and the quality of their
work product, finding that more students wrote essays when presented with
fewer potential topics and that the quality of those essays was slightly better
than essays written by students presented with more options. In the third exper-
iment, subjects could choose chocolate from either a display of six or thirty.6
Participants reported enjoying the selection process more when more options
were involved, but also reported feeling more regretful about their ultimate
choices. Together, these findings indicate that decision making involving larger
option sets can lead to decreased consumer satisfaction and misalignment of
consumer preferences.
This kind of "choice overload" can lock consumers into suboptimal health
care decisions.7 For example, consumers are consistently reluctant to change
drugs or medical treatments even when prices rise and cheaper substitute goods
are available."8 Two Harvard researchers, Richard G. Frank and Richard J.
Zeckhauser, used data from the implementation of Medicare Part D, the pro-
gram providing additional prescription drug coverage for seniors, to illustrate
how this reluctance inhibits rational choices." Medicare Part D offers seniors a
standard, government-approved "plain vanilla" option, but seniors can opt in-
stead to choose a regional plan offered by a private provider. In one county in
Massachusetts, Frank and Zeckhauser found that a consumer can choose from
among forty-seven competing plans, twenty-three of which are substantially
identical to the vanilla plan. Despite these plans' substantial similarity, the vari-
ance in price is striking: The most expensive plan charges premiums 2.4 times
greater than the least expensive plan despite nearly identical coverage. Frank
and Zeckhauser's takeaway for health care markets in this setting is stark: "Price
competition is not working."'o Similarly, economists Jason Abaluck and John
84. lyengar & Lepper, supra note 82, at 996-98.
85. Id. at 998-1ooo.
86. Id. at 1000-03.
87. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Health Insurance Exchanges-
Making the Markets Work, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1135, 1136 (2009).
88. Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics 27-28 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10881, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=612o8 3-
89. Frank & Zeckhauser, supra note 87, at 1135-36.
90. Id. at 1136.
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Gruber analyzed a sample of 2.7 million Medicare Part D recipients in terms of
the price of the Medicare Part D plans and their health expenditures.9' They
concluded that seniors are failing to act as rational health care consumers in the
Medicare Part D market. By defining a utility function based on insurance
plans' premiums, out-of-pocket costs, variance, and quality (in dollar terms),
Abaluck and Gruber find that seniors purchase Medicare Part D plans that on
average provide 27% less utility than the ideal plan.92
These findings highlight challenges in efficient health care consumption at
the aggregate level. By way of analogy, research in the consumer protection field
has repeatedly demonstrated that, where consumer errors are evident in exist-
ing data and therefore predictable, firms will take advantage of the information
asymmetry to capture profits without creating value.93 Consider a telling exam-
ple from the recent liquidation of Circuit City: The company raised its prices,
even while liquidating, because consumer data made clear that purchasers be-
lieve they are getting a good deal when a company is going out of business, even
when that company raises its prices to take advantage of increased demand.14
Other research has indicated that in situations that require complex utility cal-
culations, such as purchasing car loans, consumers are either incapable of cor-
rectly assessing the relevant trade-offs5 or fall prey to psychological factors,
such as a preference for avoiding losses rather than realizing gains,96 that have
little bearing on the ultimate value of the sought-after good.
91. Jason T. Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly:
Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 14759, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w14759.pdf.
92. Id. at 35.
93. Owen Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11
(20o8).
94. Scenes from a Recession, THis AM. LIFE (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.thisamericanlife
.org/radio-archives/episode/377/scenes-from-a-recession.
95. See, e.g., Nicholas Wonder, Wendy Wilhelm & David Fewings, The Financial Ra-
tionality of Consumer Loan Choices: Revealed Preferences Concerning Interest Rates,
Down Payments, Contract Length, and Rebates, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 243 (2008)
(analyzing results of an experiment to identify consumer preferences for automo-
bile loan attributes).
96. See Raymond S. Hartman, Michael J. Doane & Chi-Keung Woo, Consumer Ra-
tionality and the Status Quo, 1o6 Q.J. EcoN. 141, 141 (1991) ("[R]ecent empirical
analysis suggests... that consumers attach 'undue' importance to their current
commodity bundle, demonstrating 'apparently irrational' reluctance to switch to
alternative bundles. Likewise, as consumers evaluate alternatives, they are found
to asymmetrically value the losses and gains derived from changing their status
quo.").
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Policy makers administering the ACA must remain cognizant of consum-
ers' apparent inability to make complex insurance-related decisions effectively.
Simplicity should be a cornerstone of future implementation efforts.
3. The Need To Simplify Complex Choices
Because consumers will have difficulty making rational decisions related to
health care, near-universal health care markets require simplicity in order to
operate efficiently. Otherwise, System 1 biases will lead to consumer paralysis
while profit-maximizing firms take advantage of poor decision making to arbi-
trage profits by exploiting system inefficiencies. Extolling the virtues of sim-
plicity, however, does little to provide specific guidance regarding how to en-
courage more rational health care choices. This Subsection outlines a
framework for what simplicity in the health care market might look like, while
also considering the constraints that different regulatory responses may place
on consumer choice.
It is helpful to begin with a framework for understanding how "debiasing"
efforts (that is, attempts to systematically override irrational impulses) intersect
with the goal of consumer freedom. David Friedman provides a useful starting
point by suggesting that we can think about efforts to reduce System i distor-
tions in rational behavior as falling along a spectrum from the most solicitous
of consumer freedom to the most restrictive.97 Friedman delineates five levels of
government intervention, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Libertarian or a-paternalistic: government allows a fully free market
and relies on consumers to accurately process relevant infor-
mation;9'
(2) Weak-form debiasing: government provides raw statistical infor-
mation to consumers in an attempt to make them aware of rele-
vant data;99
(3) Strong-form debiasing: government makes available a "concrete in-
stance of the occurrence"' or "truthful narratives of harm" 0 ' in
order to illustrate the downside effects of various biases, although
consumer choice remains unrestrained;1 0 2
97. See David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social
Welfare, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 539, 556-59 (2011).
98. Id. at 556.
99. Id. at 557.
1oo. Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 210
(2006).
101. Id. at 215.
102. Friedman, supra note 97, at 557-58.
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(4) Insulating strategies: government protects consumers by creating
barriers to entry or hard-to-satisfy standards (such as safety stand-
ards in automobiles); 0 3
(5) Outright bans: government bars consumers from choosing certain
options in the marketplace.o 4
One of the ironies of the health care reform debate in the United States relates
to this spectrum. Calls to shift from employer-based health insurance to gov-
ernment insurance are often attacked as assaults on freedom of choice; howev-
er, private-sector employers who provide health insurance to their employees in
effect engage in debiasing option five. That is, private employers typically nar-
row an employee's list of health-plan options to a handful of choices that the
employer has prescreened for quality, price, and breadth of services.o' The ul-
timate choice presented to the consumer, therefore, involves significantly less
cognitive burden than the consumer would face as an individual attempting to
purchase insurance on the open market.
One way to facilitate efficient consumer choices would be to take the pre-
screening process that employers use and apply it to the health care market
more generally. The government could enact strict regulations that radically
limit consumer choice in the same way that employer prescreening accomplish-
es. There are reasons, however, to believe that employer-based selection of in-
surance plans is more efficient than government selection might be. Employers
have market incentives-to act as faithful agents for their employees-that
might not apply in a larger bureaucratic context.'O6 Because employers use
health benefits as a perquisite to attract and retain employees, they have an in-
centive to select plans that maximize benefits and minimize costs for their em-
ployees. It important to underscore, however, that a preference for employ-
er-based screening rests solely on who serves as the better screener, not on
whether or not a screener should intervene at all; in either situation, consumer
choice is severely constrained.
In light of concerns regarding the government's ability to prescreen health
care plans on a massive scale, option five is not an especially promising mecha-
nism to debias insurance purchasers under the ACA. Instead, the ACA frame-
work for health insurance exchanges adopts an approach that relies on option
four. Beginning in 2014, the ACA dictates that state health care exchanges offer
four benefit levels corresponding to different coverage levels: a bronze plan (co-
vers 60% of the benefit costs); a silver plan (covers 70% of the benefit costs); a
gold plan (covers 80% of the benefit costs); and a platinum plan (covers 90% of
103. Id. at 558.
104. Id. at 559.
105. See Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 34, at 248-49.
106. Id. at 248.
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the benefit costs).o7 These tiers are not based on an individual's out-of-pocket
expenses. Rather, they are pegged to the "actuarial value" of the plan as calcu-
lated in relation to a larger population. Thus, a silver plan is one in which, for
"a standard population, the plan will pay 70% of their health care expenses,
while the enrollees themselves will pay 30% through some combination of de-
ductibles, copays, and coinsurance.""o' In essence, this approach is an op-
tion-four policy that creates barriers to entry for health insurance providers
seeking a particular level of certification. The ACA insurance hierarchy also acts
as a heuristic for consumers. Just as the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration's star rating system concisely conveys information to car purchas-
ers about relative automobile safety levels, so too will tiered exchanges concisely
convey information to consumers about benefits and out-of-pocket expenses
under each plan.
Policy makers can do more to debias health care decision making without
usurping consumer choice by developing programs that invoke the "provision
of data" under debiasing option two. However, this is a challenging task. A large
body of empirical literature has documented how past efforts to provide health
care data to consumers regarding everything from hospital quality to medical
error rates have done little to change consumption patterns. Doctors Eric
Schneider and Arnold Epstein, for example, conducted a phone survey of sur-
gery patients to determine if they knew about hospital report cards published by
the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council. Only 12% of patients
knew about the report cards before surgery, although 58% responded that they
might have changed surgeons had they known about the data on surgeon and
hospital quality.o' Similarly, Karl Kronebusch explored the question of whether
patients will travel longer distances in order to visit hospitals that perform par-
ticular medical procedures at a higher volume, a fact positively associated with
quality of care." Specifying a difference-in-differences model-a regression
model comparing data from multiple locations at discrete times-that looked at
data from thousands of hospital admissions across four states, Kronebusch
found only weak evidence that patients will travel in order to access high-
107. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW 5
(2011), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8o6i.pdf.
108. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHAT THE ACTUARIAL VALUES IN THE AF-
FORDABLE CARE ACT MEAN 1 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
upload/8177.pdf. Note that individuals can face divergent health care expenses
within a single tier. The Kaiser Family Foundation asked three independent audi-
tors to assess estimated out-of-pocket expenses at each tier. The estimates for a
single individual with a bronze plan ranged from $2750 to $6350 in deductible ex-
penses, depending on the structure of the plan. Id. at 5.
lo9. Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of Public Performance Reports: A Sur-
vey ofPatients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 279 JAMA 1638, 1640 (1998).
io. Karl Kronebusch, Quality Information and Fragmented Markets: Patient Responses
to Hospital Volume Thresholds, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 777 (2009).
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er-quality care."' Moreover, survey evidence indicated that patients did not
view the number of procedures performed as a salient variable when choosing a
hospital, but rather tended to rely on factors like recommendations from
friends and family."' Kronebusch notes that reliance on these kinds of heuristics
might be even more prevalent for patients in metropolitan areas, where the
sheer volume of choices could overwhelm patients with choice. 13 Indeed, the
empirical literature on the provision of hospital report cards and other perfor-
mance metrics offers only weak evidence that health care consumers factor per-
formance metrics into their choice of health care providers."4 The fundamental
point is clear: Providing information in ways that improve consumer decision
making remains an ongoing public-policy challenge.
These examples illustrate that the effective provision of useful information
to health care consumers is difficult to accomplish. However, the public admin-
istration literature offers several approaches that HHS and the states could
adopt to make new insurance markets under the ACA more efficient. I outline
these suggestions in Section II.C, which discusses the design of the ACA's health
care insurance exchanges.
B. Theme 2: The Principal-Agent Problem
If one accepts the premise that individuals are poorly equipped to make ef-
ficient, utility-maximizing health care choices, then it seems reasonable to turn
to the other half of the doctor-patient relationship-physicians and health care
service providers-as a potential avenue for creating more rational health care
markets. This approach would focus on providing tools for health care provid-
ers to help their patients make more rational health care decisions. While such
an approach may sound promising, the doctor-patient relationship in the mod-
ern health care economy is such that patients (as principals) may have difficulty
relying on doctors (as agents) to act in their best interests. Byzantine payment
arrangements between physicians, insurance companies, and private firms
(such as drug companies) only further complicate this picture. This Section re-
views the nature of this principal-agent challenge and suggests some guiding
principles for the implementation of health care reform moving forward.
inl. Id. at 806-08 (noting that the relationship between distance and hospital volume
varies by type of treatment).
112. Id. at 783.
113. Kronebusch notes that, in four states, patients seeking knee-replacement opera-
tions could choose from an average of more than twenty-two hospitals within a
forty-mile radius. Id. at 814.
114. Id. at 781.
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1. The Nature of the Challenge
One of the most vexing aspects of health care reform efforts is identifying
the most effective link for reducing costs in the health care delivery chain. Some
critics of health care reform insist that government intervention in the health
care sector is a needless intrusion. Instead, they argue that efforts to reduce
costs should focus on increased personal responsibility, citing unhealthy diets,
smoking, and other consumer behaviors that contribute to rising health care
costs."' Alternatively, many policy makers insist that doctors and insurance
administrators must change their practices if there is any hope of bending the
cost curve."6
The reality is that someone at the consumption end of the health care
chain, like a patient, rarely understands the inputs at the production end, such
as the market pressures facing drug manufacturers. National Public Radio's
Planet Money team chronicled this disconnect in a recent segment regarding
prescription drug copayments."' The broadcast detailed how insurance compa-
nies initially intended for copayments to function as a signaling device for con-
sumers. In situations in which consumers could purchase a generic drug chemi-
cally identical to a more expensive, name-brand drug, the idea was that nominal
copayments would marginally increase the cost of the more expensive drug and
gently nudge consumers toward the more efficient choice. The "nudging" effect
of copayments, however, pitted the interest of insurance companies against
drug manufacturers, who want to steer consumers toward more profitable,
newer medications. Drug companies started issuing discount coupons, first to
doctors and then directly to patients. The result has been a complex maelstrom
of pharmaceutical marketing, byzantine insurance administration, and physi-
cian ignorance in which often neither doctors nor their patients have any idea
what a particular medication actually costs or whether or not there are less ex-
pensive alternatives available.
The prescription-drug example highlights a key challenge facing health care
reform efforts: the principal-agent problem."' In order for health care consum-
115. See, e.g., JoNel Aleccia, Health Reform Idea: Put Down the Doughnut, MSNBC
(Aug. 1o, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/323o6655/ns/health-health-care/
t/health-reform-idea-put-down-doughnut/.
116. See, e.g., Peter Orszag, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, Presentation to the Retirement
Research Consortium: Behavioral Economics: Lessons from Retirement Research
for Health Care and Beyond 8 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.cbo
.gov/publication/41727 ("A particularly important aspect of behavioral economics
is the role of social norms. Like other people, doctors tend to follow professional
norms of behavior.... That said, research suggests that norms in the medical
community do not always follow evidence-based standards of best practice.").
117. One Pill, Two Pill, Red Pill, Blue Pill, THIS AM. LIFE (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www
.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/392/someone-elses-money.
118. See Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 34, at 234.
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ers to adequately weigh the costs and benefits of various treatment and insur-
ance options, those consumers must possess underlying knowledge as to both
the efficacy of various treatment programs and their associated expense. Society
typically expects that doctors, rather than patients, will be the keepers of this
information and transmit it accordingly. As the prescription-drug example
highlights, however, physicians often lack this information themselves or lack
the inclination to act as insurance administrators, which would require them to
spend their time advising patients on the most cost-effective ways to obtain
medical care. In other words, understanding the intricacies of medical pricing
often requires a level of familiarity with insurance regulations and drug costs
that are beyond the scope of most doctors' knowledge.
Loss aversion, the finding that people tend to overvalue losses and under-
value gains relative to the status quo," also plays a role. Economist Judith Hel-
lerstein, for example, has found that doctor-patient agency problems are espe-
cially acute in the pharmaceutical context, where loss aversion often leads
doctors to resist trying new, more effective drug therapies or to refuse to pre-
scribe new generic drugs in lieu of more expensive, name-brand medications. 2 0
Indeed, as Thomas Greaney points out, it may be more accurate to refer to the
pharmaceutical context as having the "triple agency" problem of doc-
tor-patient-payer, particularly in a health care economy that relies on a complex
administrative apparatus to reimburse physicians for health care services."' As
the drug coupon saga makes clear, 2 diverging incentives between insurers,
consumers, pharmaceutical companies, and health care providers can raise in-
formation costs and further obfuscate the mechanisms that underlie health care
decision making.
Beyond access to information, the behavioral economics literature demon-
strates that other factors often intervene to complicate principal-agent relation-
ships. For example, Psychologist Brooks King-Casas and other researchers
asked forty-eight pairs of subjects to engage in a traditional "trust game" while
researchers used MRI technology to scan the participants' brains for neural ac-
tivity.' 3 Their findings indicate that certain kinds of social signals, such as reci-
procity (that is, tit-for-tat responses to another's actions), lead to predictable
neural responses that stimulate one person to trust another. These results indi-
cate that people are hard-wired for a kind of "investment" model of trust, in
which certain interpersonal signals create the "social juice" that encourages pos-
119. See Kahneman, supra note 43, at 1457-58.
120. J.K. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Physician in the Generic Versus Trade-Name
Prescription Decision, 29 RAND J. EcON. 108, 119-23 (1998).
121. Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics
Perspective, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1189, 1191 (2009).
122. See One Pill, Two Pill, Red Pill, Blue Pill, supra note 117.
123. Brooks King-Casas et al., Getting To Know You: Reputation and Trust in a
Two-Person Economic Exchange, 308 SCIENCE 78 (2005).
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itive social interactions.2 4 This trust dynamic is central to health care markets.
As Barak Richman argues, "Without a strong social norm of patient trust, and
the corresponding ethical duties placed upon the doctor, the market for health
care would collapse under uncertainty.""' Richman highlights studies suggest-
ing that trust between doctor and patient directly correlates with positive health
outcomes, such as adherence to prescribed medication regimens or therapeutic
benefits from treatment."' Moreover, these trust dynamics are mediated
through a complex web of social and economic divides, especially among
low-income patients who often depend more heavily on the judgments of their
physicians. Empirical evidence suggests that "lower levels of trust among people
of color, particularly among African Americans, may help to explain their lower
rates of care seeking, preventative services, and surgical treatment compared
with whites."2 7
Problematically, however, the trust coin has two sides. While trust is critical
in encouraging patients to follow prescribed medical regimens, it also has the
effect of turning patients into poor Bayesian updatersus with respect to physi-
cian performance. This is because patients will often perceive their doctors' ac-
tions through the filter of confirmation bias. 9 That is, if a patient comes to a
doctor's office believing, perhaps because of a personal recommendation from
friends or family, that the doctor is an effective physician, actions that might
otherwise call the doctor's effectiveness into question will instead confirm one's
preexisting attitude. Confirmation bias means that patients will often fail to in-
terpret signs regarding lack of effort from their physicians or lack of physician
quality, insulating health care providers from many of the mechanisms that
normally ensure a self-correcting, competitive market.'30
2. Potential Debiasing Mechanisms
Given the multivariate nature of the doctor-patient-payer relationship, it is
no small undertaking to design debiasing mechanisms that make a patient's re-
liance on her physician's medical advice more efficient. This Subsection sug-
124. Id. at 82.
125. Richman, supra note 37, at 734.
126. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 478-82 (2002)
(providing an overview of the therapeutic value of patient trust); David H. Thom,
Mark A. Hall & L. Gregory Pawlson, Measuring Patients' Trust in Physicians When
Assessing Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 124, 126-28 (discussing
documented benefits of doctor-patient trust).
127. Thom, Hall & Pawlson, supra note 126, at 126-27.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50 (discussing Bayesian updating).
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gests two broad approaches that inform policy recommendations regarding im-
plementation of the ACA.
First, policy makers could adopt approaches that focus on the physi-
cian-patient relationship itself. Richman, for example, finds evidence that high
levels of perceived self-control can lead to positive health outcomes in the con-
text of cancer treatment, elder care, and maintaining care regimens for treating
chronic conditions.3' For example, one study tracked the degree to which
breast-cancer patients believed that they could control whether their cancer
would go into remission. The study found that "women who believed their can-
cers were controllable exhibited a greater ability to adjust to the psychological
and physiological toils of breast cancer."'32 This suggests that designing admin-
istrative systems that empower consumers could be one goal of health care re-
form implementation efforts.133 One way to achieve this goal would be to devel-
op systems that lead consumers to feel as if they have greater autonomy over
their health care choices. As Section II.C discusses below, one way to do so
would be to create mechanisms for purchasing insurance in which consumers
have ready access to easily understood, useful information about insurance op-
tions. Another approach would take the much more aggressive tack of policing
doctor-patient communications for framing effects or other statements that
tend to trigger bounded rationality. Twerski and Cohen, for example, propose
the idea of "process rights" in the law of medical malpractice. 3 4 In essence, they
suggest that a patient would suffer a "compensable injury whenever a doctor
compromises the [patient's] decision process." 35 Apart from the issues of moni-
toring and administrative costs, this approach is also problematic in light of the
systems dichotomy outlined in Subsection I.A.2. The distinction between heu-
ristic thinking and purposive, rational decision making is likely inherent in our
cognitive wiring. While we might expect medical professionals to take on pro-
portionally more of the burden of debiasing in the doctor-patient relationship,
doctors are subject to much of the same probabilistic ineptitude as their pa-
tients (recall Tversky and Kahneman's discovery of pseudocertainty in doctors'
reactions to various treatment scenarios discussed in Subsection I.A.1). In light
of this common challenge, expecting doctors to shoulder the entirety of the de-
biasing burden seems unrealistic and unfair.
131. Richman, supra note 37, at 741-42.
132. Id. at 741 (citing Shelley E. Taylor, Rosemary R. Lichtman & Joanne V. Wood, At-
tributions, Beliefs About Control, and Adjustment to Breast Cancer, 46 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 489, 498-99 (1984)).
133. Id. at 742-43.
134. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of
Torts: The Myth offusticiable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 649.
135. See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1115, 1131-32 (2003).
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A more promising approach is to try to develop administrative systems that
align incentives in ways that debias the doctor-patient relationship by looking
retrospectively at health care outcomes. One option is to tie doctor pay to the
cost-effectiveness of the care provided to their patients. As numerous research-
ers have outlined, however, this approach has proven to be far more difficult in
practice than in theory. While some researchers have found that doctors are
quite sensitive to pricing data, they also found significant support for the thesis
that administrative challenges and bureaucratic red tape make it extremely dif-
ficult to align monetary incentives to achieve change in medical practices.136 For
example, payment schemes in Medicare and private insurance companies often
rely on the collection of charge data that includes information about costs for
labor, space, supplies, equipment, and services. When these prices change, there
is often a significant lag time before payment systems reflect the new data.'37
Cognizant of these difficulties, health care reformers are now looking to a
variety of new cost-sharing mechanisms that tie quality performance to remu-
neration schemes. Accountable Care Organizations, for example, bundle medi-
cal services from a wide variety of providers and provide coverage across the en-
tire "continuum of care."' These organizations then receive financial
incentives when their efforts result in low overhead and reduced growth rates in
the cost of health care delivery." 9 Some reformers have suggested tying reduced
patient copayments to physician use of evidence-based medicine.o4 0 Ultimately,
these systemic approaches seem more likely to achieve economic benefits than
more draconian measures that try to aggressively monitor the doctor-patient
relationship.
II. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
The aim of the first Part of this Note was to sketch out two key areas in
which the insights of behavioral economics might be particularly helpful to pol-
icy makers engaged in health care reform efforts. Part II ties these general sug-
gestions to the administrative apparatus of the ACA. This Part outlines three
key elements of the ACA and shows how insights from behavioral economics
might prove helpful in their implementation.
136. Paul B. Ginsburg & Joy M. Grossman, When the Price Isn't Right: How Inadvertent
Payment Incentives Drive Medical Care, HEALTH AFF., at W5-38o to W5-382 (Aug.
9, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/o8/o9/hlthaff.w5.376
.short.
137. Id. at W5 -378 to W5-38o.
138. NICOLE CAFARELLA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, QUALITY HEALTH CARE DELIV-
ERED EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY 7-9 (2011), available at http://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/cost containment.pdf.
139. Id. at 7.
140. BENDING THE CURVE, supra note 21, at 15.
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A. High-Risk Pools
Between now and 2014, when most provisions of the ACA become opera-
tive, expanded health care coverage is to be provided by high-risk pools. These
pools act as insurance markets providing coverage to those with a preexisting
condition who have thus been unable to obtain coverage on the private mar-
ket. 141 Under the ACA, states have the option of either adopting a plan adminis-
tered by HHS or running their own high-risk pool. Twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia have opted to administer their own plans while twen-
ty-one states have opted for the government-administered plan.' The govern-
ment has appropriated $5 billion to help fund high-risk pools around the coun-
try.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services originally estimated that
375,000 people would sign up for high-risk pools by the end of 2010, nearly ex-
hausting the original $5 billion appropriation.143 As of March 2011, however, on-
ly 18,313 people had signed up for participation in a high-risk pool.144 This pre-
sents a public-policy conundrum that has major implications for the
administration of the ACA. Some key lawmakers, such as former House Speak-
er Nancy Pelosi, have suggested that the low enrollment numbers are simply a
result of the fact that most citizens lack information about the actual provisions
of the ACA.'45 Thus, Speaker Pelosi argues, low participation in the high-risk
pools is nothing more than a publicity problem.
As critics of government health programs point out, however, low partici-
pation rates in such programs are not uncommon. Richman, for example, re-
views the literature regarding persistent gaps in participation rates in Medicaid
and argues that pure administrative barriers, such as lack of information, can-
not account for the entire gap."'1 Citing studies of Britain's National Health Ser-
vice that indicate that gaps in health coverage persist even when insurance is
141. See CASSIDY, supra note 16.
142. Press Release, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Secretary Sebelius Announc-
es New Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (July 1, 2010), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201opres/o7/2o1oo7o1a.html.
143. RICHARD S. FOSTER, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ESTIMATED Fi-
NANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,"
As AMENDED 16 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/
Downloads/PPACA_2o1o-o4-22.pdf.
144. Suzy Khimm, Why Are High-Risk Pools Having So Much Trouble?, WONKBLOG




146. Richman, supra note 37, at 718.
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universal, 47 Richman concludes that "extending health insurance does not nec-
essarily induce individuals to enroll in that insurance or to seek medical care
that is covered by that insurance; and making medical care widely available does
not necessarily translate into improved health."48 If Richman's conclusion is
correct, it suggests that the enrollment-expansion provisions of the ACA, in-
cluding the individual mandate, may fail to achieve the goal of increasing access
to health care.
Fortunately for the implementers of the ACA, new data from the Massa-
chusetts experiment with universal health care suggest that Richman's pessi-
mism is misplaced. Within two years of the signing of Massachusetts's health
care reform law in 20o6, more than 97% of state residents were insured.49
Moreover, while the Massachusetts reform effort does contain an individual
mandate, that mandate is not enforced against children or adults with incomes
below 150% of the federal poverty line.' Nonetheless, 56% of the increase in
coverage came from individuals below 300% of the poverty line.15' Thus, Massa-
chusetts has been effective at enticing people into its universal health care pro-
gram in ways that traditional insurance-extension efforts-including the
high-risk pools under the ACA-have not been. The question is why.
Researchers investigating Massachusetts's experience point to four key fac-
tors to explain the state program's success: (i) a substantial publicity campaign;
(2) automatic enrollment for individuals who had previously been enrolled in
Massachusetts's Uncompensated Care Pool; (3) a single application used across
nearly all of Massachusetts's health care subsidy programs; and (4) community
organizations and health care providers engaged in a major effort to bring peo-
147. See M.G. Marmot et al., Health Inequalities Among British Civil Servants: The
Whitehall II Study, 337 LANCET 1387 (1991); M.G. Marmot, Manolis Kogevinas &
Mary Ann Elston, Social/Economic Status and Disease, 8 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
inl (1987).
148. Richman, supra note 37, at 718.
149. DORN, HILL & HOGAN, supra note 74, at 2.
150. Massachusetts law directs the Board of the Commonwealth Connector, the ad-
ministrative agency charged with overseeing the state health care system, to pub-
lish affordability guidelines annually for compliance with the law's individual
mandate provision. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3(p)-(q) (2010). The Board sets
the affordability levels, which are then disseminated by the Department of Reve-
nue. 956 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.05 (2008). For 2012, individuals with incomes below
150% of the federal poverty line remain exempt from penalties for failure to pur-
chase coverage. MAss. DEP'T OF REVENUE, TIR 12-2: INDIVIDUAL MANDATE PEN-
ALTIES FOR TAX YEAR 2012 (2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/dor/
businesses/help-and-resources/legal-library/tirs/tirs-by-years/2o12-releases/tir-12
-2.html.
151. DORN, HILL & HOGAN, supra note 74, at ii.
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ple into the program."' These last two are especially noteworthy in light of the
behavioral economics literature.
First, integration of Massachusetts's subsidy programs into a one-stop shop
is more than an effort to reduce search costs. It targets a key concern with
health care markets-namely, the danger that cognitive burdens and status quo
bias will drive individuals to avoid changing their insurance status when faced
with a complex array of health care choices, even when such a change would be
in the consumer's best interest. In other words, administrative costs and behav-
ioral barriers to entry in health care markets are closely linked. Massachusetts's
approach successfully minimizes these twin problems. Second, the joint effort
by health care providers and community-based organizations to enroll citizens
is significant.5 3 In light of the research regarding social capital, trust, and health
care markets,154 it is not surprising that community-level efforts to engage peo-
ple yield significant increases in program participation. Another example from
Massachusetts highlights this point. Between 1996 and 2006, fishermen in
coastal Massachusetts developed a program called the Fishing Partnership
Health Plan to provide affordable health care coverage to an especially peripa-
tetic and hard-to-reach occupational sector. The plan was a stunning success,
decreasing the uninsured rate among fishermen from 43% to 13% in ten years.55
Observers have cited as one of the key reasons for the plan's success the fact that
the plan relied aggressively on using trusted community partners, such as fish-
ermen's friends and family, to recruit new members. 56
The Massachusetts example highlights that the challenge of low enrollment
in the ACA high-risk pools goes beyond a need for increased publicity. Pool
administrators should be conscious of behavioral economics' key teachings re-
garding status quo bias, the importance of simplicity, and the social dynamics
of trust. More aggressive efforts to partner with community-based organiza-
tions at the state level could encourage broader participation in high-risk pools
leading up to 2014.
152. Id. at ii-iii.
153. Id. at 6.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 123-130 (discussing trust dynamics).
155. Troy W. Hartley, Michele Gagne & Robert A. Robertson, Cases of Collaboration in
New England Coastal Communities: An Approach To Manage Change, 15 HUM.
ECOLOGY REV. 213, 215-18 (2008).
156. TERRY GARDINER & ISABEL PERERA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SHOPPING
AROUND: SETTING UP STATE HEALTH CARE EXCHANGES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
23 (20n), available at http://www.smallbusinessmajority.org/reports/shop
_exchange.pdf.
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B. Cost-Containment Efforts
As the discussion of the principal-agent problem in health care demon-
strates, reining in health care costs is a massive coordination challenge requiring
concerted action throughout the health care industry. In particular, the success
of the ACA in "bending the cost curve"' will rest on the ability of the law to
nudge doctors and other care providers into more efficient methods of provid-
ing care. As former Congressional Budget Office Director Orszag has argued,
the variation in data across the country regarding the ratio of expenditures to
health outcomes must rest on different regional norms among doctors."' The
success of health care reform is thus bound up in changing doctors' attitudes
regarding their role within the health care delivery system.
The ACA's approach to this challenge is largely technocratic, relying on the
intervention of experts to develop more specific proposals for cost-containment
mechanisms. The most important element of this approach is the creation of
IPAB. This fifteen-member panel is tasked with monitoring growth in the rate
of health care spending. If health care costs exceed the rate of growth in GDP
per capita plus one percent, the panel will issue recommendations for decreas-
ing costs that will then be fast-tracked through Congress and, short of congres-
sional action, implemented through regulations by HHS. The hope is that IPAB
can push the health care system toward a more evidence-based approach to
treatment and care, discouraging expensive treatments with little empirical rec-
ord of producing better health outcomes.' 9 In the context of the deficit debate,
the Obama Administration has repeatedly argued that IPAB can reduce health
expenditures. In the spring of 2011, the Administration proposed expanding the
panel's powers and changing its mandate to keep health care costs down to a
more aggressive rate of GDP per capita plus 0.5 percent.160
A behavioral economics approach, however, demonstrates that a purely
technocratic effort will likely not be enough to seriously change medical prac-
tices. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that doctors are susceptible to opti-
mism bias, overreliance on habits, self-serving justifications, and a wide array of
157. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (discussing the link between health care
reform and fiscal reform).
158. Orszag, supra note 30, at 2-4.
159. This approach has not been without controversy. See, e.g., IPAB: The Controversial
Consequences for Medicare and Seniors: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 112th Cong. (2on) (statement of Jack Lewin,
CEO, Am. Coll. of Cardiology), available at http://republicans.energycommerce
.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Health/o713n/Lewin.pdf (outlining physician ob-
jections to certain avenues for cost-cutting).
160. Igor Volsky, Obama Relies on Independent Payment Board To Achieve Health Sav-
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other "irrational" behaviors."' Cost containment must involve mechanisms that
circumvent these natural impulses and change cultural norms in the medical
community.
One prominent proposal focuses on a "checklist" approach that identifies a
series of rote steps, which, in turn, can improve quality of care. Physicians tend
to resist these programs, yet numerous studies have indicated that lists of simple
procedures can often save lives. Such programs have proven effective at improv-
ing health outcomes in contexts ranging from airports to emergency rooms.6 2
The adoption of professional standards for anesthesiologists, for example, is
widely credited with radically decreasing anesthesia-related deaths in the
1980s.16 3 At the 2011 Harvard Medical School commencement ceremony, Doctor
Atul Gawande argued that the medical profession needs a wholesale revision in
its thinking about the role of the individual doctor in a complex, infor-
mation-overloaded society. Gawande adopted an apt metaphor, arguing that
the medical profession needs "fewer cowboys and more pit crews," an approach
to medicine in which checklists and protocols are commonplace because indi-
vidual physicians see themselves as part of a larger health care team rather than
as heroic free agents.16 4 From a cost-containment perspective, the hope is that a
new, team-oriented ethos among physicians can bolster administrative efforts,
like the adoption of Affordable Care Organizations, to integrate cost savings in-
to the provision of health care services more generally.
The behavioral economics literature indicates that these kinds of efforts to
shift cultural norms in the medical profession will be as vital to the success of
health care reform as efforts to discourage unhealthful behaviors like smoking
and obesity. The promise of an approach that focuses on developing new health
care norms is that it attacks the problem of inefficient health care markets on
two fronts. First, it tackles the bounded rationality phenomena discussed in Sec-
tion L.A by introducing administrative processes that short-circuit the effects of
cognitive biases. The checklist model thus recognizes that overreliance on indi-
vidual physician performance can lead to the aggregation of errors. In effect, the
checklist approach is an attempt to make System 1 processes more efficient and
less error-prone."' Second, the model addresses the principal-agent dynamics
that frustrate an individual's ability to make efficient health care choices. A
161. For a general discussion, see Greaney, supra note 121, at 1197-1200.
162. See Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. io, 2007, at 86; see also ATUL
GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2009).
163. Orszag, supra note 30, at 7 (citing David Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What
You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1427 (2001)).
164. Atul Gawande, Commencement Address to Harvard Medical School: Cowboys
and Pit Crews (May 26, 2ou), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
newsdesk/2ou0OS/atul-gawande-harvard-medical-school-commencement-address.html.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79 (discussing System i and System 2 pro-
cessing).
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norm that celebrates doctors as team players rather than as heroic actors is
more conducive to reform efforts that require cooperation among a multitude
of health care actors. These norm-changing efforts will thus be a critical com-
plement to other, more technocratic efforts in the coming years.
C. Health Care Exchanges
One critical area of the ACA where the teachings of behavioral economics
will be especially helpful is the creation of state exchanges. The ACA leaves most
of the institutional design choices regarding the specifics of state exchanges to
HHS.'66 HHS is currently engaged in a rulemaking process that will specify in
greater detail how the exchanges will operate. With respect to the consumer ex-
perience, HHS has thus far offered only broad guidelines: Exchanges will be
"designed for consumers" and
will make it easy for consumers and small businesses to compare health
plans, get answers to questions, find out if they are eligible for tax cred-
its [to help pay] for private insurance or health programs like the Chil-
dren's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and enroll in a health insur-
ance plan that meets their needs.16 7
The teachings of behavioral economics should prove helpful as HHS continues
its rulemaking efforts.
Designers should be attuned to the real risk of cognitive overload that af-
flicts consumers making complex health care consumption choices.'68 As the
experience with extreme price variation in the context of Medicare Part D plans
indicates, 6 9 when consumers are not easily able to compare prices along useful
metrics, the competitive marketplace will lead to inefficient consumption out-
comes.1'o Designing efficient health care exchanges does not necessarily mean
restricting consumer choice; it simply means creating a marketplace in which
"[c] hoice is optimized [because] it focuses the enrollee's attention on the salient
features of the health plans."171 In order to apply the lessons of this research,
HHS must take its regulatory responsibilities as overseer of the state exchanges
166. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1321, 124 Stat. 119, 186 (2010) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 18041).
167. Affordable Insurance Exchanges, supra note 18.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86 (discussing choice proliferation and its
consequences).
169. See Frank & Zeckhauser, supra note 87; supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
170. See discussion supra Subsection I.A.2.
171. TIMOTHY JOST, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES
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seriously. A laissez faire approach to certification or presentation of infor-
mation nearly guarantees consumer confusion and suboptimal outcomes.
There are several key requirements that should accompany successful
transparency regimes' 2 : (1) Information must be easy for citizens to use;73 (2)
metrics must promote accuracy and comparability; 74 and (3) metrics must fo-
cus on comprehension.'75 Restaurant sanitation grades in cities such as Los An-
geles and New York are excellent examples of the effective provision of infor-
mation to consumers.76 City health agencies engage in an aggressive regime of
inspection and reporting in order to gather the relevant data regarding food
safety practices. They also develop an algorithm to transform the results of that
reporting into one, easily understood metric. This involves a significant admin-
istrative effort and collaboration with the local restaurant community. In New
York, however, the resulting message to consumers could not be clearer. Each
restaurant receives a letter grade: A for satisfactory, B indicating some prob-
lems, and C indicating failure. These grades are plainly posted in restaurant
windows and are visible from the street. Consumers know what this infor-
mation means and how to integrate it into their decision making about where
to dine.
HHS should learn from the sanitation-grade experience and focus aggres-
sively on providing an intuitive, straightforward display of relevant information
to exchange customers. By helping consumers distinguish between irrelevant
marketing and actual differences in coverage, regulations can foster the sense of
self-control and empowerment that often correlates with better health out-
comes.'" Moreover, by streamlining and simplifying the number of variables
that a consumer must consider when choosing an insurance policy, the ex-
changes can help consumers better match consumption decisions to their risk
preferences. This should help make health care purchases more efficient. The
system for "shopping" the exchanges must therefore allow consumers to con-
duct apples-to-apples comparisons of health care plans without being com-
pletely overwhelmed by data. This will require making hard decisions about
what variables are or are not relevant and how such information should be pre-
sented.
HHS has already moved substantially in this direction by releasing a draft
version of a four-page disclosure document, the Summary of Benefits and Cov-
172. See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., JOHN F. KENNEDY SCH. OF Gov'T, HARVARD UNIV.,
TRANSPARENCY POLICIES: Two POSSIBLE FUTURES (2007), available at http://www
.ftc.gov/be/workshops/mortgage/articles/funggraham2007.pdf.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id.
176. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PER-
ILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 61 (2007).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133.
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erage (SBC),"7 that, beginning in September 2012,17 will accompany the stand-
ard marketing materials provided by insurers to potential customers.so One
commenter has already dubbed these "nutrition labels for health insurance, "8.
an evocative phrase that captures the goal of providing consumers with clear,
easily understandable information about health care choices. The drafting of
the disclosure document has not been without controversy, however, with
health insurers and consumer groups sparring over the amount of detail to in-
clude in the mandatory disclosure.8 2 The current SBC regulations include in-
formation on deductibles, out-of-pocket expenses, specialist coverage,
in-network and out-of-network services, dental and vision care, and notable
care exclusions."a3 Perhaps most interestingly, the SBC contains two coverage
examples, having a baby and managing diabetes, that break down hypothetical
insurance coverage and patient costs (see Figure i).
The current SBC draft represents an impressive attempt to convey critical
information to consumers in an easy-to-read, comprehensible fashion. The first
page, in particular, provides straightforward information about deductibles and
out-of-pocket limits that will help consumers compare plans along similar met-
rics. Similarly, the coverage examples represent a useful attempt to provide con-
sumers with illustrations of how their insurance might work without
178. A summary of these new regulations appears in Summary of Benefits and Cover-
age and Uniform Glossary-Templates, Instructions, and Related Materials; and
Guidance for Compliance, 77 Fed. Reg. 8706 (Feb. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
179. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Health Reform To Require
Insurers To Use Plain Language in Describing Health Plan Benefits, Coverage
(Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2o12pres/o2/201202o9a
.html.
18o. The development of a Summary of Benefits and Coverage (SBC) document was
mandated by section 2715 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.,
as revised by the ACA. For a more detailed explanation of the interaction between
the two statutes, see Summary of Benefits and Coverage and Uniform Glossary, 77
Fed. Reg. 8668, 8669-70 (Feb. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 54 & 602; 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
181. Sarah Kliff, Coming Soon: Nutrition Labels for Health Insurance, WONKBLOG (Feb.
9, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/coming
-soon-nutrition-labels-for-health-insurance/2012/o2/o9/gIQAPJUwiQ-blog.html.
182. Sarah Kliff, Insurance Companies Push To Delay Labeling Regs, WONKBLOG (Jan.
27, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/
insurance-companies-push-to-delay-labeling-regs/212/od127/gIQAxjoyVQ-blog.html.
183. The current SBC template is available online. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF BENE-





CURING WHAT AILS US
Figure 1: Current SBC Coverage Examples14
Having a baby
(nouinal dehivery)
" Amount owed to providers:
$10,000
" Plan pays $
m You pay $
Sample care costs:
First office visit $100
Radiology $300
Laboratory tests $200














Limits or exclusions $
Total $
Managing diabetes
(foutine maintenance of existing
condition)
a Amount owed to providers:
$7,800
" Plan pays $














Limits or exclusions $
Total $
overwhelming them with unnecessary or confusing information. Indeed, before
HHS adopted the draft SBC, the draft disclosure underwent two focus group
and interview sessions, one conducted by insurance companies"'5 and one con-
ducted by an outside consumer group.186 Several key findings from the latter of
184. NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, BLANK SUMMARY OF COVERAGE 5 (201), available
at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees b-consumer-information-hhs
dol submission11o7_soc-blank.pdf.
185. See JKM RESEARCH, AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS: Focus GROUP SUM-
MARY (2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees b-consumer
information_101012_ahip-focus-group-summary.pdf.
186. See KLEINMAN COMMC'Ns GRP., INC. & CONSUMERS UNION, EARLY CONSUMER
TESTING OF THE COVERAGE FACTS LABEL: A NEW WAY OF COMPARING HEALTH
INSURANCE (2011), available at http://www.yourhealthsecurity.org/wordpress/
wp-content/upload/20on/08/A New Way-of-ComparingHealthInsurance2.pdf.
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these sessions are worth noting. First, the use of coverage examples appears to
have been very helpful in grounding consumers' analysis,"' serving as a helpful
corrective to the kind of cognitive errors discussed in Section I.A. Second, re-
searchers found that consumers were able to identify key information about
costs and deductibles in the SBC and think about the ways in which to apply it
to their personal health care decisions.'
However, some findings merit a note of caution. For example, researchers
found that individuals preferred more detailed versions of disclosures that
broke out specific costs rather than listing one lump sum."9 As previous re-
search regarding consumer choice has indicated, however, a preference for
more data in the present does not necessarily translate into future satisfac-
tion.'9 o Future efforts to improve the SBC should focus on tracking consumers'
actual experience with purchasing insurance rather than simply presenting hy-
pothetical consumers with draft disclosure forms. It may turn out that there is a
gap between the information that consumers think they want and what actually
turns out to be helpful.
Identifying the best manner in which to convey information through the
exchanges is only half of the challenge. The other half is determining what data
will help consumers make more rational insurance choices. Frank suggests a
useful dichotomy: We need to think both about the consumer experience with
health care (that is, the ease with which patients interact with the health care
system) and the quality of the care itself.'9' While the SBC will help consumers
make more reasoned decisions with respect to the first metric, it does not pro-
vide assistance with respect to the second. Assessing quality of care requires an
understanding of both medical science and systemic evaluation that is beyond
the ability of the average health care consumer.
Communicating quality-of-care data will therefore require policy makers to
think critically about how to assemble and present the data in an
easy-to-understand manner. Consequently, it makes sense for health care ex-
changes to offer consumers two different metrics for comparing insurance
plans. The first should focus on consumer experience, while the second should
focus on professional benchmarks of care quality.
The consumer-oriented metric could rely on a standard survey instrument
designed by HHS or the insurance community. Alternatively, a bolder approach
might involve integrating a Yelp-style ratings system into exchange websites.'9 '
187. KLEINMAN COMMC'NS GRP., supra note 186, at 9.
188. Id. at 21.
189. Id. at ii.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 (discussing lyengar and Lepper's re-
search on choice and happiness).
191. Frank, supra note 88, at 13.
192. Yelp is a website that provides, according to its own description, a "fun and easy
way to find and talk about great (and not so great) local businesses." YELP,
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Such a system would help solve one of the key inhibitors of rational health care
purchasing decisions, the overreliance on recommendations from friends and
family. By aggregating large amounts of information into a single rating metric,
Yelp presents its readers with a simple, comprehensible benchmark for making
consumption choices. A Yelp-style system would allow exchange customers to
make insurance decisions based on a "wisdom-of-crowds" approach rather
than relying on more dubious heuristics.
Moreover, other websites have demonstrated that simple, easy-to-use inter-
faces that aggregate user-provided content can be quite effective in shifting the
behavior of bureaucratic systems. The website SeeClickFix.com, for example,
allows users to input data regarding local grievances, such as unfixed potholes
or malfunctioning streetlights. The site has been quite successful in "crowd
sourcing" user-provided content to improve the provision of municipal ser-
vices.1 93 A series of SeeClickFix.com complaints by members of the Wooster
Square neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut, expressed concern that the
lack of lighting on a local footbridge created a prime location for the mugging
of evening commuters. The city responded by installing solar-powered lighting
on either side of the footbridge.194 Likewise, a website that asked consumers to
rate their satisfaction with their health insurance could provide a way to quickly
and efficiently communicate the quality of the purchaser experience to custom-
ers. A temptation might be to disaggregate this kind of evaluation, asking a
small sample of consumers to complete a more rigorous evaluation of their in-
surance providers along a broad variety of metrics, but the restaurant sanitation
grades example suggests that this kind of approach is precisely the wrong way to
communicate useful information to consumers. A single metric is a stronger
way to integrate satisfaction data into the exchange experience.
Second, health-exchange websites should provide an easily understood
metric regarding health care quality. While such data might help make health
care markets more efficient, consumers often do not realize that this kind of in-
formation is available. A 2004 survey revealed that only one in three health care
consumers had reviewed any quality data in the previous year regarding differ-
ent health plans, doctors, or hospitals.'95 There has been some push among pol-
http://www.yelp.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). The site allows users to rank
businesses on a five-star scale and write their own reviews. These reviews are then
searchable along a number of criteria, including type of business, location, and
price. For a discussion of Yelp's effect on local businesses, see Dan Frost, 'The Cof-
fee Was Lousy. The Wait Was Long.', N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2008), http://www
.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/business/smallbusiness/21yelp.html.
193. See Daniel E. Slotnik, News Sites Dabble with a Web Tool for Nudging Local Offi-
cials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at Bi.
194. See Allan Appel, Wooster Square Said: Let There Be Light. And There Was, NEW
HAVEN INDEP. (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/
archives/entry/andwooster-square-said let there-be_1ight andtherewas/.
195. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMERS' ExPERI-
ENCE WITH PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY INFORMATION 6 (2004), available at
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icy makers to make quality data more easily accessible. For example, HHS runs
a website that gathers data on hospital quality.196 The information, however, is
both difficult to access and unwieldy to navigate. A visitor to the website starts
by entering a zip code and is presented with a list of local hospitals. After click-
ing on a hospital, the website offers four categories of quality data: (i) pro-
cess-of-care measures, (2) outcome-of-care measures, (3) use of medical imag-
ing, and (4) survey of patients' hospital experiences. Visitors must click through
each of these categories-each of which presents data using different criteria
and different benchmarks-in order to have any sense of how hospitals stack up
against one another. The overall design of the website is far too burdensome to
provide the kind of one-look heuristic that will help consumers make decisions
while avoiding the choice overload that often accompanies making probabilistic
choices in the face of too much information.
A far better approach for the ACA exchanges would be to present a single
metric that aggregates large amounts of information related to quality. Interest-
ed consumers could drill down into the underlying data, just as Yelp readers
can browse individual reviews. The key element, however, is a simple way to
present large amounts of data quickly to exchange customers. This is in some
respects counterintuitive, insofar as policy makers often believe that bombard-
ing consumers with information will help them make better choices.'97 A
streamlined exchange system will thus be open to the charge that it overprivi-
leges some kinds of data while glossing over others. Still, the provision of quali-
ty data to consumers will be effective only if it is simple enough to understand
and quickly assimilate into health care purchasing decisions.
The use of technology and the Internet can be only part of the story of cre-
ating successful health care exchanges. Researchers have found that the use of
data to make health care decisions is consistently lower among less-educated
and poorer populations.9' Policy makers implementing the ACA must be cog-
nizant of the fact that overreliance on easy-to-access forms of information, such
as websites, may reinforce socioeconomic divides in the health care market.'99
As with the cooperation of community-based organizations in implementing
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/National-Survey-on-Consumers-Experiences
-With-Patient-Safety-and-Quality-Information-Survey-Summary-and-Chartpack.pdf.
196. See Hospital Compare, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES, http://www
.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov (last updated Apr. 19, 2012).
197. See, e.g., Geraint Howells, The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by
Information, 32 J.L. Soc'y 349 (discussing the prevalence of disclosure and infor-
mation rules in consumer protection policy despite the limitations of such re-
gimes).
198. See Kronebusch, supra note no, at 782.
199. See, e.g., France Belanger & Lemuria Carter, The Impact of the Digital Divide on
E-Government Use, 52 COMM. ACM 132-35 (2009) (discussing the results of a sur-
vey finding that income, education, and age were significant predictors of citizens'
use of government services online).
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Massachusetts's health care reform law, the engagement of community leaders
and health care professionals will be critical. The fundamental point, however,
remains: Only through careful consideration of both what information to pro-
vide to consumers and how to provide it most effectively will the exchanges
avoid tripping over the same behavioral obstacles that have traditionally made
purchasing health care coverage so daunting for consumers.
CONCLUSION
The task facing health care reformers in implementing the ACA is much
more than a series of administrative hurdles. It is also a challenge of political
economy. Political rhetoric always prizes freedom of choice such that any ef-
forts to cut down on consumers' options are ripe for attack. Further, one of the
ACA's liabilities is that it is so expansive. By trying to improve efficiency all
along the health-production chain, the law is open to criticism for inefficiency
and vagueness. Consider the law's allotment of $15 billion over the next decade
to promote healthy behaviors and reduce the incidence of especially costly
health conditions like obesity. House Republicans recently labeled this a "slush
fund" and voted to eliminate it altogether.20 0
The ultimate success of efforts to bend the cost curve while expanding cov-
erage will, in this charged political environment, hinge on a long and difficult
slog for administrators and health care reformers alike. The key lessons of be-
havioral economics should, however, provide guidance throughout this process.
An approach that recognizes the confusion that often surrounds health care
purchases and the need to build social trust between doctors and patients, and
one that seeks to empower consumers rather than overwhelm them, is the only
way for health care reform ultimately to succeed in its mission to both expand
access and reduce costs.
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